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Earlier this century, Pope Pius XII addressed the morality of artificial
insemination in four allocutions.! In doing so, he laid a foundation for
determining the morality of various technical means to achieve conception.
They can be licit if they assist the conjugal act, and they are illicit if they
replace the conjugal act. This teaching was further developed in the more
recent instruction of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:

Donum Vitae. 2
The Magisterial teaching is clear: the technologies that assist the
conjugal act can be licit; those that replace it are illicit. What is not clear,
however, is how one determines whether a reproductive technology assists
or replaces the conjugal act. For some technologies, such as in vitro
fertilization, the determination is easy. They replace the conjugal act since
there is no conjugal act at all, and fertilization occurs outside the mother' s
body.
Furthermore, the Magisterium has determined that certain
procedures are illicit. 3 Yet for other technologies, the determination
remains difficult, and the Magisterium has not pronounced on their liceity.
For example, reputable theologians faithful to Magisterial teaching are
divided whether GIFT (Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer) assists or replaces
the conjugal act, and the Magisterium has not determined its liceity. In a
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press conference on the day Donum Vitae was promulgated, Bartholomew
Kiely, SJ said, "The instruction does not pronounce a judgment on GIFT.
It leaves it open to research by biologists and further discussion by
theologians.,,4 Because it is not clear how to determine which technologies
assist the conjugal act, Edward Vacek has noted that
[w]e will have to await clarification from the Vatican on what kinds of
medical interventions are permitted. A marital sexual act done with
love is required. To some this implies two spatial criteria: the sperm
must be ejaculated in the vagina, and fertilization must take place in the
body of the woman. Clarification will be needed on whether the
Instruction permits ova to be medically removed, on whether the sperm
can be withdrawn from the vagina posl coilum, and on whether the
sperm and ovum can then be inserted in the womb or in a fallopian
5
tube.

Therefore, clear criteria are needed to determine whether a reproductive
technology assists or replaces the conjugal act.
In this essay, I will strive to elucidate such criteria, thereby facilitating
the application of the teaching of Donum Vitae. First, I will examine the
recent discussion of reproductive technologies, primarily GrFTITOTS ,6 to
see how various authors determine whether a given reproductive
technology assists or replaces the conjugal act. The most attention will be
given to Peter Cataldo and Josef Seifert, who do in fact articulate criteria to
determine the assistance to or replacement of the conjugal act. Other
authors propose criteria implicitly by arguing for or against the liceity of
various technical interventions . I will determine which criteria are
unsuitable and need to be excluded by falsifying certain views. I will also
determine which criteria are suitable by verifying and further developing
other viewpoints. Second, I will propose various criteria that can be used
to distinguish assistance to the conjugal act from replacement, and, third, I
will apply these criteria to selected reproductive technologies.

A. Proposed Criteria to Distinguish Assistance from Replacement
1. A Natural Act oflntercourse
Carlo Caffarra offers a rich anthropological meditation and then
7
applies it to a moral evaluation of different reproductive technologies.
When it comes to the question of criteria to determine whether a
reproductive technology assists or replaces the conjugal act, the following
passage is most pertinent:
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What is ethically essential, then, is that between two spouses there
be a true and proper conjugal act. This has already been demonstrated
in the first part of the presentation. By "a true and proper conjugal
act" should be understood "the activation of that capacity for sexual
activity without which capacity, according to the theological and
canonical doctrine of the Church, one would be up against the
impediment of impotency ".
From the ethical point of view, once this act has been posited,
nothing else is required of the two spouses. Any subsequent recourse
they may have to some artificial intervention amounts, therefore, to
giving assistance to the procreative act which, insofar as it is a human
act, has already in itself been completed. 8

He requires just one criterion, a true and proper conjugal act. If this has
been done, all other interventions can be considered as forms of assistance.
However, Caffarra overlooks an important criterion advanced by
Donum Vitae. The child must be the fruit of the conjugal act;9 that is, the
conjugal act must be the principal cause of the child's conception.
Nicholas Tonti-Filippini astutely observes that Donum Vitae not only
requires that there must be a true and proper conjugal act, but also that the
child conceived must be the fruit of the conjugal act. "That is to say, the
conjugal act must have a direct causal relationship to the origin of new
life."\O
Thus, it is not simply enough to say that the conjugal act is completed .
It is also pertinent whether the conjugal act is successful in causing
conception. More specifically it is pertinent whether a technical means
assists the conjugal act in causing conception or replaces it. According to
Caffarra's criterion, if there is a natural act of intercourse, is it then
guaranteed that the conjugal act will still be the principal cause of
conception no matter what subsequent interventions are employed? Some
assert that the conjugal act is closely associated with a natural process.
Caffarra does not see any relevance of the natural processes subsequent to
the conjugal act because, from the ethical point of view, the conjugal act is
completed. Yet these natural processes may have important ramifications
for determining whether a technology assists the conjugal act. If these
natural processes are interrupted by the technical intervention, does that
disrupt the causal connection between intercourse and conception? If so,
the one criterion he proposes, though true, may be insufficient by itself
because more must be taken into account.

2. The Child Conceived as the Fruit of the Conjugal Act, and the
Moral Unity between the Conjugal Act and the Reproductive
Technology
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Orville Griese believes that GIFT/TOTS could be morally licit. There
is a true and proper conjugal act open to life. Because conception could
occur by the sperm deposited in the vagina, the causal link between the
conjugal act and conception is preserved, and so also the inseparable bond
between the unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act is
preserved.
Since some theologians might insist that the TOT procedure could be
morally acceptable only if there is some possibility of a causal
relationship between the preliminary conjugal union and conception, it
should suffice to point out that there is always the possibility that the
husband ' s sperm deposited in the wife 's vagina during the preliminary
act of conjugal union could account for the fertilization of the
repositioned ova. Due to that undeniable possibility, the inseparable
bond between the unitive and the creative dimension of that particular
preliminary act of conjugal union remains intact with regard both to
intent and fact. 11

Finally there is a moral union between the conjugal act and the intervening
technical procedure because of the short duration of time needed to perform
12
the procedure after the conjugal act has been posited.
Donald McCarthy argues for the possible liceity of GIFT/TOTS
because there is a true and proper conjugal act and the child conceived
would be the fruit of the conjugal act.
The Vatican Instruction teaches that "procreation is deprived of
its proper perfection when it is not desired as the fruit of the conjugal
act, that is to say, of the specific act of the spouses' union" (II , B, 4a).
In the case of TOTS, a true conjugal act takes place. The fertilization
which occurs may result from the husband 's sperm which are deposited
directly in the wife ' s vagina. It may more likely occur from the sperm
that are inserted in the Fallopian tube. In either case, normal in vivo
fertilization occurs as a result of a specific and proper procreative act of
the spouses. 13

In addition, he believes that GIFT/TOTS is probably licit because
fertilization takes place within the body of the mother, in its natural
location as opposed to in a laboratory with in vitro fertilization.
Furthermore, the conjugal act is not replaced by the technical intervention,
which merely repositions the gametes in a somewhat similar way as the use
of a syringe to propel the sperm further up the woman ' s reproductive tract.
It so aids the conjugal act in reaching its objectives because it forms a
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moral unity with the conjugal act derived from the same end. Thus, the
conjugal act remains the essential step leading to conception . 14
Germain Grisez's primary criterion is that the child conceived must be
the fruit of the conjugal act, that is, the conjugal act must be the real cause
of the child ' s conception . The conjugal act is not the real cause of the
child ' s conception if it is merely incidental to the procedure. Furthermore,
a procedure does not assist the conjugal act if it does not share the same
goal as the conjugal act. In other words, there must be a moral unity, which
is derived from the end, between the conjugal act and the technical
procedure. 15
Grisez believes that the conjugal act is incidental to the procedure
GIFT/TOTS, and for this reason , the causal link between the conjugal act
and conception is sundered . Fertilization is not caused by the conjugal act
because the sperm that are used in the procedure are not deposited in the
vagina by the conjugal act. Instead, the sperm utilized to fertilize the ovum
in GIFT/TOTS have been intentionally withheld from the marital act and
collected in the silastic sheath . Furthermore the ovum to be utilized is
removed from the woman prior to intercourse and then later introduced
after intercourse. Since the ovum is absent during the marital act, its
fertilization can hardly be considered the aim of the marital act. In sum, the
child conceived would in no way be the fruit of the conjugal act, since the
ovum and sperm that are used in no way pertain to the conjugal act. The
sperm have been intentionally withheld from the act, and the ovum
removed prior to the act. The man and woman would merely provide the
material for the technical procedure from which conception is the fruit. 16
If this were the sole criterion for the moral evaluation, one would reach a
conclusion similar to Germain Grisez' s.
Assisting the marital act is not wrong in itself, so long as the
couple engage in a genuine marital act that remains the real cause of the
child' s conception. Instead of the actual procedure used in TOTS,
suppose that after the couple engaged in a normal act of intercourse, the
semen were taken from the vagina and/or the ovum from the ovary, and
one or both elements, perhaps after treatment of some pathological
condition or conditions, were moved to the fallopian tube where they
could meet. Provided the intention motivating such procedures were
precisely to assist the marital act, these steps would do that. Somewhat
similar technical maneuvers, however, could violate rather than assist
the marital act, if they were intended, for example, merely as a scientific
experiment or as a way to delay conception by freezing the elements so
that the couple might choose to have a child later. 17
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As long as there is a true and proper conjugal act and the sperm used in any
subsequent intervention has been deposited in the vagina, the subsequent
interventions are considered to assist the conjugal act. Such interventions
share in the same goal or end as the conjugal act and would be said to assist
in just that way. The continuity of the causal process is preserved insofar
as the unity of the end is maintained. The conjugal act and the subsequent
interventions all aim at the same goal , so the technical interventions are
said to assist the conjugal act achieve that same goal. When the goal of the
interventions is different from that of the conjugal act, for example when
they are used for experimental purposes or to delay conception, the unity of
the causal processes is broken . The interventions could no longer be said
to assist the conjugal act because they no longer aim at the same goal as the
conjugal act.
These authors implicitly propose the following criteria for
determining whether a reproductive technology assists or replaces the
conjugal act. I) There must be a true and proper conjugal acl. 2) The
child conceived must be the fruit of Ihe conjugal act. 3) In order for the
child conceived to be the fruit of the conjugal aCI, the conjugal acl must not
be merely incidental to the procedure. 4) Conception must lake place
within the mother 's body. 5) There must be a moral unity between the
conjugal act and a subsequent technical intervention.
Once again, the first criterion is obvious. Any technical intervention
cannot be said to assist the conjugal act if there is no conjugal act.
With respect to the second criterion, McCarthy observed that Donum
Vitae requires that the child conceived be the fruit of the conjugal act.
However, McCarthy holds that in GIFT/TOTS the child could be the fruit
of the conjugal act either from the sperm deposited in the vagina or from
the sperm inserted into the fallopian tube, and Griese just presumes that
this causal link between the conjugal act and conception is preserved if the
spenn is deposited in the vagina and so could possibly fertilize the ovum .
Though this is a true criterion enunciated by Donum Vitae , these authors do
not adequately explain how it must be fulfilled, for they do not examine the
possibility that a subsequent intervention might frustrate the causal
influence of the conjugal act on fertilization . This topic will be taken up in
greater detail later.
The third criterion helps to discern whether the child is the fruit of the
conjugal act. As Grisez observed, if the gametes used to obtain conception
do not pertain to the conjugal act, then the conjugal act is merely incidental
to the procedure, and the child cannot be the fruit of the conjugal act.
The fourth criterion is also an important one. McCarthy posits this
criterion by observing that the conjugal act aims at fertilization within the
mother' s body. Fertilization outside the mother' s body is not the proper
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goal of the conjugal act. 18 Furthermore, fertilization outside the mother's
body subjects human generation to the liabilities of the laboratory.1 9
Further discussion will present additional reasons for the truth of this
.
•
JO
crlterlon .The fifth criterion of moral unity is also necessary. Griese and Hess
seem to consider moral unity with respect to the time within which the
intervention occurs. It seems to be necessary to preserve moral unity that
the subsequent intervention and resulting conception occur within a time
period somewhat proximate to the conjugal act. Otherwise, for example, if
the sperm and ovum were harvested and injected into the fallopian tube a
year later, how could one say that the resulting conception would be the
fruit of a conjugal act that had occurred a year earlier? However, Griese
and Hess do not provide any reasons for the truth of moral unity based on
time. Though it seems true, it must be true for some reason. McCarthy and
Grisez consider the moral unity of the technical intervention in terms of a
shared goal. To preserve moral unity, the technical intervention must have
the same goal as the conjugal act, namely, fertilization within the mother's
body. McCarthy believes GIFT/TOTS preserves that moral unity because
the sperm and ovum are merely repositioned to achieve that goal,
fertilization within the mother' s body. Grisez believes that a technical
intervention would share the same goal as the conjugal act if the sperm
were removed from the vagina after intercourse and later introduced.
Obviously, if a technical means were employed for a purpose other than
obtaining conception, for example for experimental purposes, it could not
be said to assist the conjugal act achieve conception. Yet this criterion of
moral unity derived from the end is insufficient in itself for it does not
consider whether any subsequent intervention, even though it shares the
same end as the conjugal act, may disrupt the causal link between the
conjugal act and conception. More must be considered to determine
whether conception is the fruit of the conjugal act.
In sum, these five criteria are important to determine whether a
reproductive technology assists or replaces the conjugal act. However, this
presentation of the criteria is deficient in that it does not provide an
adequate account of how to determine whether the child is the fruit of the
conjugal act.

3. Principal and Instrumental Causes, Active Condition, and the
Immediate Causal Factors that are Natural
Peter Cataldo presents a detailed account of how to determine
whether the child is the fruit of the conjugal act. He says:
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It is important to interpret the meaning of substitution or
replacement in this context as referring not simply to (I) the elimination
of the physical act of marital coitus, but also to (2) the usurpation of the
proper causality of the conjugal act beyond coitus, even though that act
may have been performed and the semen collected in a morally
acceptable way. Since assistance to the conjugal act includes assistance
to the generative process as the natural objective beyond the physical
act of coitus, the meaning of substitution or replacement must also refer
to that same process beyond coitus. I will presume both meanings of
substitution and replacement throughout my analysis. Procedures that
assist the conjugal act preserve the essential link between the conjugal
act as the beginning and end points of a process. Those that replace the
conjugal act sever the link.! '

In order to determine whether the link between the conjugal act and
conception is preserved, Cataldo introduces the distinction between
principal cause, instrumental cause, and active condition . The conjugal act
remains the principal cause of conception provided that the reproductive
technology serves as an instrumental cause or supplies the active
conditions. 22 In this light, Cataldo offers the following definition of
assistance and replacement and the criterion to distinguish assistance from
replacement.
Extrapolating from Donllm Vitae and considering the causal
concepts examined above, the following definitions for replacement and
assistance may be given: A procedure replaces the conjugal act if

either coitus is not perjormed. or the conjugal act is not the principal
(per se) cause ojj ertili::ation itself A procedure assists the conjugal
act if it supplies the instrumental causes and active conditions(s) jor
the conjugal act to junction as the principal (per se) cause oj
j ertilization itself
A criterion for morally evaluating specific
procedures consistent with the definitions would be: A procedure
replaces the conjugal act if it determines, of itself, and immediately, the
success of fertilization. A procedure assists the conjugal act if it does

not determine, oj itself and immediately. the success oj jertilization,
but rather allows jertilization to take place under immediate causal
(actors that are natural. This criterion covers both types of assistance
.in the teaching, viz., assistance to the performance of the conjugal act
23
itself and to the attainment of its objective.

There are two major strengths and two major weaknesses to Cataldo ' s
proposed definition of assistance and replacement and his proposed
criterion to distinguish assistance from replacement. These strengths and
weaknesses will now be considered .
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a. Strengths of Cataldo's Definition and Criterion
i. The Conjugal Act Must Be the Principal Cause of Fertilization
In order to distinguish assi stance from replacement, Cataldo notes that
24
it is necessary to employ the concept of causality from metaphysics.
A
principal cause is per se responsible for the effect, and so Cataldo, in
referring to Donum Vitae , shows how the conjugal act is to be the principal
cause of ferti Iization:
The conjugal act is described in term s of per se causality in Donum
Vitae where it states that the conj ugal act is ''' per se suitable for the
generation of children to which marriage is ordered by its nature and by
which the spouses become one fl esh. ", The conjugal act of the spouses
is aptly suited as a principal cause since both spouses act together as
principal agents in an action ordered to the effect of the ex istence of a
new human life which, as such , is an effect that has an essential likeness
to the human nature of the parents. Thus the spouses, in and through
their conjugal act, are the conjoined principal causes of the child. Thi s
is what is meant by the description of the conjugal act as the principal
cause of fertilization .25

This observation will be critically important in distingui shing assistance
from replacement. If some cause other than the conjugal act, namely a
technical means, is the principal cause of fertilization , then the conjugal act
is replaced. If the conjugal act remains the principal cause of fertilization ,
and the technical means is the assisting cause of fertilization , then the
conjugal act is assisted. The question then , will be to distingui sh what is
the principal cause and what is the assisting cause of fertilization .
ii. Supplying an Active Condition(s) as a Type of Assistance

Cataldo describes an active condition as something that removes
obstacles that prevent a cause from being effective. An active condition
makes " it possible for a cause to exercise its activity. In general we may
define a condition as a circumstance or set of circumstances that makes it
possible for something to operate as a cause. ,,26 An active condition
simply removes obstacles that frustrate the causality of the conjugal act.
Thus, one can conclude that " [p ]rocedures that assist the conjugal act can
also be said to supply the active condition( s) for the act to function as the
principal cause offertilization."n
The truth of this conclusion, which Cataldo also incorporates in his
definition of assistance, can be easily seen . An active condition as such
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does not exert a positive causal influence on the final effect. It just
provides the circumstances in which the principal cause can bring about the
effect. In this regard , Robert Kreyche astutely observes that
every real cause (in whatever order of causality) exercises a

positive influence. Similarly. every effect is said to depend really and
positively on the cause or causes that contribute to it. At this point,
however, we must consider the distinction between a cause in the
proper sense of the term and something characterized as a condition.
A condition should not be called a "cause," because the
" influence" of a condition is chiefly negative . .. . [T]he influence of the
condition is negative in that it consists in the removal of obstacles
without which the effect could not take place. Hence, the role of a
condition as such is to make it possible for a cause to exercise its
activity.28

Because an active condition does not exert any positive causal influence as
such on the effect, it cannot be con sidered the principal cause of the effect.
It does not, then , usurp the primacy of the principal cause. Rather, it
remains subordinate to and so assi sts the principal cause in bringing about
the effect.
Cataldo adds an important point that must be considered to determine
whether, in fact, a reproductive technology provides an active condition .
Any criterion that applies the teaching to procedures would need
to distinguish those that provide active conditions from those that do
not. In other words, there is a difference between procedures that
provide active conditions, which remove a hindrance specific to the
natural causality of the conjugal act, and procedures that remove a
hindrance only accidentally, as a result o f creating a whole new line of
29
causality for fertilization.

To make such a distinction, Cataldo notes that fertilization must occur
under the immediate causal factors that are natural, for he notes that
" Dol1um Vitae focuses on those specific causes and conditions that bring
about the act of fertilization itself," and that the Instruction requires that
conception takes place within the mother ' s body. 3o In this way, Cataldo
believes that one would be dealing with a procedure that truly, and not
accidentally, removes a hindrance, because it would allow fertilization to
occur in its natural place, allowing the conjugal act to exercise its principal
causality. For this reason he believes that GIFT provides the active
conditions for the conjugal act to be effective. It allows conception to take
place under the immediate causal factors that are natural. The immediate
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causal factors under which fertilization occurs are not determined or
created by the procedure." For this same reason he believes that in vitro
fertilization only accidentally removes a hindrance and does not, therefore,
supply the active conditions for the conjugal act to exercise its principal
causality. It introduces its own line of causality because the procedure
itself supplies the immediate causal factors that bring about fertilization.
Thus, the procedure, and not the conjugal act, causes fertilization .32
In sum, Cataldo makes an important contribution in the attempt to
distinguish assistance from replacement. A procedure assists if it supplies
an active condition(s) for the conjugal act to exercise its own principal
causality. If fertilization occurs outside the mother' s body, the technical
means does not truly supply an active condition(s), rather it introduces a
whole new line of causality that replaces the conjugal act.

b. Weaknesses of Cataldo's Definition and Criterion
i. The Introduction of the Term "Instrumental Cause"
As noted above, Cataldo defines a procedure that assists the conjugal
act in this way:
A procedure assists the conjugal act if it supplies the instrumental
causes and active condition(s) jor the conjugal act to junction as the
principal (per se) cause ojjertilization itself )}

If he said "supplies the assisting causes'- instead of " instrumental causes", I
would not object. However, . the use of " instrumental cause" in his
definition brings difficulties to the attempt to distinguish assistance from
replacement. I will now proceed in three steps in order to illustrate these
difficulties: a) Cataldo ' s definitions of principal and instrumental causes
along with the conclusion he reaches; b) the first difficulty in the term
" instrumental cause"; c) finall y, the second difficulty in the term
" instrumental cause" .

a) Principal and Instrumental Causes
The principal cause is per se responsible for the effect and acts on its
34
own power. " The conjugal act is described in terms of per se causality in
Donum Vitae where it states that the conjugal act is ' per se suitable for the
generation of children to which marriage is ordered by its nature and by
which the spouses become one flesh. ' ,,35 The principal cause is primarily
responsible for the effect; whereas, the instrumental cause plays a
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subordinate role in bringing about the effect.
Cataldo defines an
instrumental cause as "something other than , and extrinsic to, the principal
cause or agent, which uses the in strument to bring about an effect.,,36 The
instrument is really a cause s ince it is in some way responsible for the
effect. For example, the types of brushes that the artist uses will determine
the texture and definition of the paintin g, yet the artist as such remains the
cause of the painting. He is primarily responsible for the painting and the
brushes have a subordinate role. Cata ldo then distinguishes two types of
instrumental causes: (A) one that acts s imply in a one-to-one relationship,
as a writer (the principal cause) uses a pen (the instrumental cause) to write
(the effect); and (8) " the in strumenta l use or application of something that
acts with its own principal causality, e.g., the tran sfusion of blood to
produce health.,,37 This di st inction between the two types of in strumental
causes will be taken up later in greater deta il.
Then, after examining principal and instrumental causality, Cataldo
concludes:
Reproductive technologies that provide genuine assistance are
those that constitute the instrumental causes to the principal cause, the
conjugal act. The in strumentali ty of these procedures is a combination
of the two types of instrumental causes. The natural , principal causality
of the conjugal act is used and applied for its own fulfillment (8 above)
by means of other various instrumental causes (A above) .38
The two difficulties can now be seen by taking up the two parts of this
conclusion.

b) The First Difficulty
The first way in which the te rm " in strumental cause" muddies the
waters arises because Cataldo overlooks that there are two manners in
which an instrumental cause can be an ass isting cause . In the first manner
(I), an instrumental cause is necessarily an assisting cause with respect to
the agent or cause that applies it. An instrumental cause must be applied
by a principal cause to which it is subo rdinate, or which it assists. Cataldo
himself indicated thi s in his definition of an instrumental cause:
" something other than , and extrin sic to, the principal cause or agent, which
uses the instrument to bring abo ut an e.!fect. ,,"9 In thi s way, an instrume~tal
cause is necessarily an assisting cause in sofar as it assists the principal
cause that applies it. For example, when an author uses a pen to write a
letter, the pen, the instrumental cause, is necessarily an assisting cause with
respect to the author who uses th e pen. In the second manner (2), an
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instrumental cause mayor may nor be an assisting cause with respect to an
agent or cause other than the one {hell applies it. For example, a person
dictates a letter to a scribe who uses a pen to write it. The pen is an
instrument applied by the scribe. Even though the pen is not applied by the
person dictating the letter, one can still see that the pen assists the person
dictating to write the letter. Yet on the other hand , for example, a beaver
begins to gnaw on a tree to bring it down. After he takes only a few bites, a
man comes by, scares the beaver away and chops down the tree with an
axe. The axe is an instrument applied by the man . The beaver is a cause
other than the one that appl ied the instrument. Here the axe does not assist
the beaver. The axe assists the man who remains the principal cause of
felling the tree, for he provided by far most of the effort. If anything, the
beaver is another assisting cause. He assisted the man in felling the tree,
insofar as he took out a small chunk of the tree with his teeth.
In the first part of hi s conclusion, Cataldo considers the reproductive
technologies with respect to the conjugal act: " Reproductive technologies
that assist are those that are instrumental causes to the principal cause, the
conjugal act.,,40 However, the conjugal act is not the agent that applies the
technologies; the medical personnel apply the technologies. Therefore, the
technologies are the instruments of the medical personnel , or perhaps also
the spouses, but they are not instruments of the conjugal act.
This is where the confusion arises . Instrumental causes (in this case
the reproductive technologies) are necessarily assisting causes with respect
to the agent or cause that applies them. The medical personnel, or perhaps
also the spouses, are the agents or causes that apply them . Therefore, the
reproductive technologies are necessarily ass isting causes with respect to
the medical personnel, or perhaps the spouses. Instrumental causes (in this
case the reproductive technologies) may or may not be assisting causes
with respect to an agent or cause other than the one that applies them. The
conjugal act is a cause other than the one that applies them. Therefore, the
reproductive technologies may or may 110{ be assi sting causes with respect
to the conjugal act.
Thus, defining assistance to the conjugal act in terms of " instrumental
causes" brings confusion to the attempt to distinguish assistance from
replacement. Since the reproductive technologies are not applied by the
conjugal act, insofar as they are instrumental causes, they mayor may not
assist the conjugal act in achieving conception. Now the use of a technical
means may still assist the conjugal act, but one cannot determine that it
assists insofar as it is an instrumental cause, for it is not an instrument
applied by the conjugal act as the principal agent, but by the medical
personnel or perhaps even the spouses. Thus, one might say that a
technical means is an instrumental cause that assists the medical personnel
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who apply it, but then it still needs to be determined whether the medical
personnel are assisting the conjugal act by applying this technical means.
c) The Second Difficulty

There is a second way in which the term "i nstrumental cause"
muddies the water. There are two types of instrumental causes. Cataldo
considers the second type of instrumental cause to be a principal cause.
This is where the problem lies, for, properly speaking, an instrumental
cause is an assisting cause, not a principal cause. As already noted above,
Cataldo describes the two types of in strumental causes this way: (A) one
that acts simply in a one-to-one relation ship, as a writer (the principal
cause) uses a pen (the instrumental cause) to write (the effect); and (8) "the
instrumental use or application of something that acts with its own
principal causality, e.g., the transfusion of blood to produce health .,,4 1 He
then incorporates this notion of the two types of instrumental causes in his
conclusion:
The instrumentality of these procedures is a combination of the two
types of instrumental causes. The natural , principal causality of the
conjugal act is used and applied for its own fulfillment (8 above) by
means of other various instrumental causes (A above).42
In this conclusion he seems to think that the natural causality of the
conjugal act is an instrumental cause of the second type (8) that in tum is
applied by the technical procedures, which are instrumental causes of the
first type (A). There is some problem in analyzing Cataldo's position here,
because he does not say how the natural causality of the conjugal act is the
second type of instrumental cause. He does not say how it is applied by the
other instrumental causes. He simply asserts this.
One can only surmise what may have led him to assert that the natural
causality of the conjugal act is an instrumental cause of the second type (8)
that in tum is applied by the technical procedures, which are instrumental
causes of the first type (A). If one looks at the procedure GIFT/TOTS, one
might be able to uncover hi s thought. Perhaps Cataldo considers the
introduction of the sperm and ovum into the fallopian tube in this
procedure as something analogous to a blood transfusion , since the sperm
and ovum act with their own proper causality within the mother' s body,
just like blood acts with its own proper causality in a blood transfusion .
Even though it is not clear how Cataldo reaches his conclusion, he will be
given the benefit of the doubt.
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Regardless of how Cataldo concluded that the natural causality of the
conjugal act is an instrumental cause of the second type (B) applied in tum
by the technical procedures which are instrumental causes of the first type
(A), one might look at Cataldo' s position in this way. Since the second
type of instrumental cause is a principal cause, it remains a principal cause
even though it is applied by another agent or cause. Since the natural
causality of the conjugal act is the second type of instrumental cause, it
remains a principal cause even though it is applied by some other agent or
cause. Because Cataldo considers the second type of instrumental cause to
be a principal cause, he can maintain that the natural causality of the
conjugal act remains the principal cause of conception even though it is
applied by the technical procedure.
Yet as already noted, there is a problem here insofar as Cataldo
considers the second type of instrumental cause to be a principal cause.
Properly speaking, all instrumental causes are not principal causes; they are
assisting causes. Thus, if the natural causality of the conjugal act is the
second type of instrumental cause (B), it cannot be the principal cause of
conception. Instead of describing the second type of instrumental cause the
way Cataldo does as "the instrumental use of something that acts with its
own principal causality," it is better to describe it as "the instrumental use
of something that acts with its own proper causality."
To see better Cataldo' s misunderstanding, let us now take a closer
look at this second type of instrumental cause. Another author, Martin
Vaske, SJ, describes the second type of instrumental cause this way:
Natural forces may be used instrumentally to bring about an
effect intended by the principal cause. A lumberjack, for example,
instead of grubbing up the stump of a tree by the direct use of simple
instruments, such as an axe and a shovel, may use the natural power of
dynamite to blow the stump sky-high. In such cases, the powerful
activity of a natural agent is directed along an intended line by the
principal cause.43

This second type of instrumental cause (B) may also be seen in the work of
the brew master who pitches yeast into the wort to make beer. The
brewmaster is the principal cause of the beer, but he makes use of the
natural activity of the yeast to do so. In these examples, the lumberjack and
the brewmaster are primarily responsible for the effects; they are the
principal causes. The dynamite and the yeast playa subordinate role in
bringing about the effects. They are the instrumental causes that are
applied under the direction of the principal causes. Thus, it is best to
describe the second type of instrumental cause as "the instrumental use of
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something that acts with its own proper causality." In this light, one can
see that if the natural causality of the conjugal act is an instrumental cause
that is applied by the technical procedures, then the natural causality of the
conjugal act is the assisting cause and the technical procedure the principal
cause of conception .
In sum, there are two major difficulties in defining assistance to the
conj ugal act in terms of instrumental causes. First, instrumental causes are
necessarily assisting causes with respect to the agent or cause that applies
them . Instrumental causes may or may not be assisting causes with respect
to an agent or cause other than the agent or cause that applies them. Since
the conjugal act is a cause other than the agent or cause that the applies the
reproductive technologies, the reproductive technologies, as instrumental
causes, may or may not be assisting causes with respect to the conjugal act.
Second, all instrumental causes are assisting causes subordinate to the
principal causes that apply them. If, in fact, the natural causality of the
conjugal act is an instrumental cause, then it is an assisting cause
subordinate to the technology that applies it. Thus, the technology would
be the principal cause, and the conjugal act the assisting cause of
conception . Perhaps Cataldo ' s difficulty stems from overlooking that an
instrumental cause is not the only type of assisting cause.
ii. Drawing the Line at the
That Bring About Fertilization

Immediate Causal

Factors

Cataldo misunderstands the causal continuity between the conjugal
act and conception. To distinguish assistance from replacement, he draws
the line at the immediate causal factors that bring about fertilization. This,
perhaps, is the greatest weakness of his position . He states:
The reproductive technologies analyzed here affect the objective
of the conjugal act. For this reason it is critical to note that the criterion
proposed below for morally evaluating procedures centers on the way in
which fertilization takes place in the procedures. The act offertilization
is pivotal in Donum Vitae for detennining whether a procedure has
replaced the conjugal act. With respect to assistance for what is called
the "natural purpose," "proper end," or "natural objectives" of the
conjugal act, Donum Vitae focuses on those specific causes and
conditions that bring about the act of fertilization itself. Accordingly,
the criterion has been fonnulated on that basis. This is also why
Donum Vitae explicitly emphasizes the fact that in IVF fertilization
occurs outside the body... .
If and when fertilization is successful in IVF, it is so precisely
because of active conditions that are outside and independent of the
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body. Thus, in the language of Donum Vitae, fertilization has been
detennined by technical action. Given the pivotal role of fertilization in
Donum Vitae for making ethical evaluation, any criterion for
distinguishing between procedures that assist and procedures that
replace must draw the line at the immediate causal factors within the
procedures - both causes and active conditions - that bring about
fertilization itself. Whether these factors are due to the procedure is not
the question. By contrast, if the line were not drawn at fertilization,
then the distinction between assistance and replacement would collapse.
By not beginning a moral evaluation with the factors of fertilization
itself, any third party action . .. interposing itself at any point between
the conjugal act and fertilization could arguably be considered as
replacing the causal action of the conjugal act. 44
Cataldo then provides his criterion to determine whether a procedure
assists or replaces the conjugal act.
A procedure replaces the conjugal act if it determines, of itself,
and immediately, the success of fertilization. A procedure assists the
conjugal act if it does not determine, of itself, and immediately the
success of f ertilization, but rather allows fertilization to take place
under the immediate causal factors that are natural. 45

If one considers this criterion more closely, one notes that it is true,
but not sufficient. The immediate causal factors that are natural can only
be found within the mother's body. Clearly, if fertilization occurs outside
the mother's body, for example, in a procedure such as in vitro fertilization
in which the gametes meet because they are placed in a culture medium in a
petri dish, these immediate causal factors introduce a whole new line of
causality, and the causal link between the conjugal act and conception is
sundered. The conjugal act could no longer be considered the principal
46
cause of conception .
The immediate causal factors in this technical
intervention, as well as any technical intervention that occurs outside the
mother' s body, determine of themsel ves and immediately the success of
fertilization. Therefore, fertilization can only occur within the mother ' s
47
body, as Donum Vitae so observes. Furthermore, provided that there is a
true act of intercourse, the gametes are obtained in a morally licit way, and
fertilization occurs within the mother' s body, that is, under the immediate
causal factors that are natural, any technical means employed would be said
to assist the conjugal act. Yet the insufficiency of this criterion can be seen
in light of an example provided by Nicholas Tonti-Filippini.
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Consider the situation in which sperm has been obtained from the
vagina subsequent to a "true and proper conjugal act", but is frozen
awaiting its use in a GIFT procedure. Ova are obtained and these too
are frozen and stored in order to await the recovery of the uterus from
the effects of the superovulants or some other illness. Eventually, say
five months later, the ova and sperm are thawed and transferred
separately to the fallopian tubes where a new life originates. 48
In this case, conception would occur under the immediate causal factors
that are natural, and so would meet Cataldo' s requirement for assistance.
However, could a conception really be caused by a conjugal act that took
place five months earlier? In some way Cataldo ' s criterion is insufficient.
If one adds to Cataldo' s criterion the one of moral unity based upon
time which was discussed above, the difficulty proposed by TontiFilippini ' s example could be avoided, for such a procedure would not meet
the criterion of moral unity based upon time. In fact, in another work,
Cataldo proposes such a criterion. He holds that the sperm must be used
within seventy-two hours of its collection because that is the period of its
49
natural viability for fertilization .
However, in the discussion of this
criterion as proposed by Griese and Hess, no cogent reasons are given why
it must be met. It is simply asserted . Yet Cataldo supplies a reason:
seventy-two hours is the period of natural viability of the sperm for
fertilization . However, must the sperm be used within seventy-two hours
just because this is the natural period of viability? Why could not freezing
the sperm to use it later be considered an assistance insofar as it extends the
period of viability? There must be some reason why such a delay frustrates
the principal causality of the conjugal act.
Cataldo observes that the conjugal act initiates a whole process or
series of secondary causes that lead to conception, and that assistance and
replacement must also refer to this generative process beyond the conjugal
act. 50 Subsequent discussion wi II show that if the continuity of this natural
causal chain is broken, the principal causality of the conjugal act is
replaced. Yet Cataldo does object to such a criterion,5 ) and his objections
and answers to them will be taken up in the course of discussion. Attention
now turns, then, to the discussion of the natural processes, which are
subsequent to the conjugal act and lead to conception, and the necessity of
the continuity of this causal chain to preserve the principal causality of the
conjugal act.

4. The Fruit of the Conjugal Act and the Continuity of the Causal
Process from the Conjugal Act to Conception
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a. Inadequate Accounts of the Necessary Continuity of the Causal
Process
Some authors believe that the multiple technical interventions in
GIFT/TOTS break the continuity between the conjugal act and
conception. 52 It seems that implicit in this objection to GIFT/TOTS might
be the inviolability of the natural processes that are initiated with the
conjugal act and lead to conception . For example, DeMarco provides a
distinction between assisted and artificial insemination based upon natural
processes.
In "assisted" fonn s of insemination. the spenn retains its own
capacity for movement and travel s through its naturally appointed
course. Insemination is artificial when the spenn is entirely passive
with regard to its manner of relocation , and travels through a route that
nature did not provide.53
The multiple technical interventions in GIFT/TOTS violate the continuity
between the conjugal act and conception that these natural processes
provide. Yet it is still not clear why this continuity provided by the natural
processes is so necessary to preserve the principal causality of the conjugal
act. There are several questions to be answered . What does it mean to
interrupt this continuity provided by the natural processes subsequent to the
conjugal act? Does any subsequent intervention or modification of these
processes constitute an interruption of the continuity? If this continuity is
interrupted, why must one then conclude that the technical intervention
replaces the conjugal act? If this continuity is interrupted, why must one
conclude that the technical means is then the principal cause of conception?
Why cannot these technical interruptions be considered acts of assistance?
It cannot be that the number of technical interventions, or simply that there
are interventions, are the reasons why the causal continuity between the
conjugal act and conception is disrupted .5~
Nicholas Tonti-Filippini astutely observes that Donum Vitae not only
requires that there must be a true and proper conjugal act, but also that the
child conceived must be the fruit of the conjugal act. His criteria then are
two: 1) There must be a true and proper conjugal act. 2) The conjugal act
must have a direct causal relationship 10 the origin of new life. TontiFilippini also provides a way to determine whether the conjugal act has
such a direct causal relationship to the origin of new life.
In order to preserve the inseparable connection between the
unitive and procreative meanings, aspects or dimensions of the conjugal
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act, the direct causal connection between the conjugal act and the origin
of a human life must be uninterrupted by any other human act. .. .
In general, those forms of assistance within the context of a
marriage which do not displace the conjugal act and do not interrupt the
direct causal process between the conjugal act and the origin of new life
seem to be acceptable. 55
He sees here that the conjugal act initiates a causal process, that is, the
natural processes subsequent to the conjugal act that lead to conception. A
technical intervention that interrupts this natural causal process replaces the
conjugal act since the direct causal relationship of the conjugal act to
conception has been sundered . Thus, the technical means would be the
direct cause of conception and the conjugal act only the indirect cause of
conception . In this way, the technical means replaces the conjugal act. For
this very reason Tonti-Filippini gives a negative moral evaluation of
GIFT/TOTS. 56
Why must this causal process initiated by the conjugal act remain
intact? To support such an opinion Tonti-Filippini provides an analogy
with golf. If a caddy were to push the golfer' s ball closer to the hole after it
had stopped, his intervention would not be a; assistance to the golfer' s
drive, but an act distinct from the drive. These are two distinct acts even
though they have the same goal, to move the ball toward the hole. In
GIFT/TOTS there are two such distinct acts. The conjugal act is indirectly
the cause of conception insofar as it supplies the sperm. However, the
technical intervention is the direct cause of conception because fertilization
57
follows as a consequence of that intervention.
Tonti-Filippini does well to speak of assistance and replacement in
terms of causality insofar as the child conceived must be the fruit of the
conjugal act. However, it is not helpful to distinguish assistance from
replacement in terms of direct and indirect causes. From his account, it
seems that the last intervening cause is the principal cause. Is that always
true? Peter Cataldo, for example, observes that in nature the conjugal act is
never the direct cause of conception . In the natural processes, which are
subsequent to the conjugal act and which lead to conception, there is a
whole structure of secondary causes leading to conception . Thus, one
cannot conclude, as Tonti-Filippini does, that the conjugal act is not the
principal cause of conception because it is not the direct cause of
conception. 58 Tonti-Filippini has misunderstood the way the conjugal act
causes conception through the subsequent natural processes. It does not
cause conception directly but mediately. Therefore, if the principal
causal ity of the conjugal act is to be preserved, the continuity of the natural
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causal chain must require something other than that the conjugal act be the
direct cause of conception.
In commenting on Donum Vitae, Agneta Sutton makes an important
contribution to detennine what it means to assist the conjugal act. She lists
two ways in which a technology may assist the conjugal act: I) assist the
perfonnance of the conjugal act; 2) complete a process initiated by the
conjugal act or allow the sexual act to be causally effective in achieving
conception.
Donum Vitae makes a distinction between, on the one hand,
interventions which bypass sexual intercourse and amount to a
substitute for it and, on the other, interventions which facilitate the
performance of the sexual act, complete a process initiated by the
sexual act or allow the sexual act to be causally effective in achieving
conception. 59

Sutton then provides a moral evaluation of reproductive technologies
based upon the manner in which a technical intervention may be said to
assist. Though Sutton provides no example, she deems that an intervention
that helps a couple perfonn the conjugal act is morally licit. 60 This satisfies
her first criterion. One can also note that the natural processes that follow
intercourse remain undisturbed . In addition, the conjugal act would be
causally effective in achieving conception, since there would be no other
way by which the gametes could come in contact with each other. There
are no other interventions. In this way her second criterion is also satisfied.
Using these same criteria, Sutton judges another procedure to be
morally pennissible. After intercourse, a couple may utilize a medical
intervention to transport the spenn deposited in the vagina further up the
wife's reproductive tract. Such an intervention may not remove the spenn
from the wife's body in order to reintroduce it later. Rather it involves the
use of an instrument to assist the passage of the spenn from the vagina
through the cervix to the uterus, and so enable it to reach the site of
61
fertilization.
Sutton believes this meets the second criterion. With this
intervention, the conjugal act " is an essential part of the sequence leading
to conception. It, and not a medical intervention, initiates this sequence.,,62
In this way the intervention is said to complete a process initiated by the
conjugal act and so also allows the conjugal act to be causally effective in
achieving conception.
Sutton again uses these same criteria to evaluate GIFT/TOTS, which
she considers to be illicit. Since GIFT/TOTS removes the spenn from the
woman's vagina and later deposits it along with an ovum in a fallopian
tube, it initiates anew the process that leads to conception . It does not,
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then, complete a process initiated by the conjugal act. Thus, the child
conceived would be the fruit of the technical intervention and not the
63
conjugal act. This violates the second criterion.
Note that in this discussion Sutton has overcome the weaknesses of
Tonti-Filippini's presentation. For her, it is not necessary that the conjugal
act be the direct cause of conception in order to preserVe its principal
causality. Yet, she recognizes the importance of the natural processes,
which are subsequent to the conjugal act, and which lead to conception. In
order to preserve the principal causality of the conjugal act, the conjugal
act must initiate this causal process, and a technical intervention may then
complete this causal process, but it may not initiate it anew.
Based upon Sutton's discussion, the following criteria to judge
whether a technology assists or replaces the conjugal act may be proposed.

1) A technical intervention that enables the performance of the conjugal
act can be said to assist the conjugal act. 2) A technical intervention may
complete the natural processes initiated by the conjugal act or may allow
the conjugal act to become causally effective in achieving conception. Any
intervention that initiates these natural processes anew replaces the
conjugal act, for then the technical means is causally effective in achieving
conception and not the conjugal act.
There are weaknesses, though in Sutton's account. She does not
demonstrate how she arrives at these criteria. It is not clear why a technical
intervention may not initiate the natural processes anew. Implicit in her
criteria is the notion that if the technical means initiates the processes that
lead to conception instead of completing them, it then is the principal cause
in bringing about conception, not the conjugal act. Yet, unfortunately,
Sutton does not demonstrate why that is so . More analysis is still needed.

b. A Necessary Continuity of the Causal Process
In a splendid, thorough treatment on the distinction between
assistance and replacement, Josef Seifert reaches the following conclusion
on the requirements for a reproductive technology if it is to assist the
conjugal act:
In the light of these distinctions we may now say that an activity,
in order to qualify as assistance to the conjugal act, rather than
substituting it, must fulfill the conditions - inasmuch as they concern
the relation between the sexual intercourse and conception - which are
required quite generally for the continuity of a causal process and which
also apply to the causal link between the conjugal act and conception.
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Moreover, the unity and continuity of the process requires the
preservation of the personal act's meaningful bond to conception. It
must not be the case that another personal act lacking the inner unity
and meaningful rapport to conception, becomes the principal cause of
conception. 64
To understand Seifert' s conclusion one must first note that intercourse
is the cause of conception through the natural processes that are subsequent
to and initiated by the marital embrace. In general, "a certain effect
proceeds from the act [a human act] as from its cause in such a way that we
can speak of a continuity of the process which leads from the cause to the
effect. ,,65 In particular, intercourse initiates a causal chain of events that
leads to conception. The conjugal act and the subsequent natural causal
processes are intimately linked in bringing about conception. Conception
would not occur without either. In the marital embrace, the spouses initiate
a whole series of events that may continue for days before conception may
result. Conception may result from their marital embrace insofar as they
are bringing about the conditions in which a new human life can come to
be, provided that they do not do anything to prevent conception. Previous
discussion has questioned why the natural processes, which are subsequent
to the conjugal act, are relevant for determining whether a technical
intervention assists or replaces the conjugal act. Such processes are indeed
relevant because the conjugal act causes conception through these natural
processes. As Cataldo observed: " The unity of the sex act necessarily
represents an intrinsic structure of secondary causes intervening between
the conjugal act and its effect, fertilization .,,66
For the conjugal act to exercise its causality in bringing about
conception, it must do so by initiating a natural causal process, or a causal
chain of events. Thus, one must examine how causes that initiate a causal
chain of events are said to be the principal causes of the last effect in this
causal chain. It will be shown that for an initiating cause to be the principal
cause of the final effect, there must be a continuity of the causal process.
Seifert describes four marks of the continuity of such a process. If any of
these aspects of continuity are disrupted, the cause that initiates the process
cannot be said to be the principal cause of the final effect of the process.
Thus, if the continuity of the causal chain that is initiated by the conjugal
act is disrupted, the conjugal act can no longer be said to be the principal
cause of conception.
Finally, there must be a meaningful bond between conception and the
human action that brings it about. Seifert observes that only the conjugal
act is a worthy cause of conception. 6 7 Though he does not develop this
much, a discussion of the "language of the body," helps to illustrate why
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only the conjugal act is such a worthy cause. 68 Only the conjugal act can
disclose the child's truth as a person, as a gift to be fulfilled by self-giving
in love. Only the conjugal act can disclose the child's truth as an image of
God insofar as he is a person who is to fulfill himself by entering into a
communion of persons, ultimately by sharing in the communion of the
Divine Persons. "Thus assistance to the conjugal act can be defined as an
activity which respects the meaningful and non-substitutable bond between
the personal conjugal act and procreation as its effect.,,69 This meaningful
bond is broken when the continuity of the causal process, which is initiated
with the conjugal act, is disrupted.

i. Temporal Continuity
The first type of continuity of the causal chain is temporal. Temporal
continuity between the cause and effect can be either simultaneous or over
a span of time in which the consequences of the original cause continue to
occur. To preserve temporal continuity, "there must never be a complete
temporal hiatus between the initiation of the causal chain through the
principal cause and the last effect produced by it. ,,70 In simultaneous
continuity the effect occurs at the very same time the human person is
acting and causing the effect. When someone carries a bag of groceries
from the market, the groceries are carried at the same time the person is
carrying them , and the groceries cease being carried when he puts them
71
down on the kitchen counter.
What is more pertinent here, though , is the temporal causality over a
span of time in which the consequences of the initial causal act continue to
be operative. Seifert refers to an example from sport to illustrate this type
of continuity in the causal chain.
If a soccer player hits a ball which continues to move, in virtue of the
player having shot it, and if it never stops completely from moving in
consequence of the original shot, then we are confronted with one
minimal condition for the continuity of the causal process that proceeds
from the original player and his action. If the ball comes to a complete
standstill, during which it does not move in any way under the influence
of the original cause, we can no longer say that a further pushing of the
ball by another player is an assistance to the original chain of causality.
The complete temporal hiatus, during which the ball rests, contradicts
the continuity of the causal chain. It requires an entirely new cause to
move the ball from where it came to a standstill; and this new cause can
no longer be interpreted as a mere assistance to the original causal
chain.
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Of course, it is still possible that the two causal chains interact so
that we can say that one player assists the other to get a goal shot. In
fact the whole team should and does in that larger sense assist each
other. Nevertheless, it would not be right to say that a player that
places the ball near the goal where it came to a complete standstill shot
a goal if another player moves it after it has come to a complete
standstill and shoots the goal. We cannot say that here the second
player assisted the first one ' s shooting a goal, albeit all will admit that
the activity of the first player decisively contributed to, and in that sense
assisted, the activity of the second player rendering it possible. 72

The causal activity of the conjugal act with respect to conception involves
this type of temporal continuity over a span of time. When a couple engage
in the marital embrace, conception does not come about at the same time as
the embrace. Rather, a series of natural processes are initiated that can
continue for days before conception may occur. The conjugal act and the
subsequent natural causal processes are intimately linked in bringing about
conception. Conception would not occur without either.
It also must be noted that the temporal continuity of a causal chain
does not mean that all motion cannot cease. There can be various
programmed starts and stops. Yet if there are such programmed starts and
stops, the influence of the initial cause must still be operative through all
these starts and stops for the temporal continuity to be preserved. There
must never be a time when the influence of the initial cause ceases to be
operative. Otherwise, the temporal continuity is broken. 73
Not all causal activity initiated by the human person requires temporal
continuity. For example, one may make a conditional contract, the effects
of which may not be operative until several years after the contract has
74
been established.
Yet the causal activity of the conjugal act requires
temporal continuity to preserve its principal causality in bringing about
conception. As seen, temporal continuity over a span of time is necessary,
because conception is not caused simultaneously with the marital embrace.
Rather, the subsequent natural processes are necessary to bring about
conception, and these subsequent natural processes occur over a span of
time.

ii. Logical Continuity Derived from Efficient Causality
The second type of continuity of the causal chain is a logical
continuity derived from efficient causality. This type of continuity of the
causal chain is linked to the temporal continuity of the causal chain . In this
type of logical continuity of a causal chain, one sees a series of distinct
causal events, but each one is linked back to the initial causal action of the
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human person. For example, someone has set up hundreds of dominos so
arranged that one push will topple them all. Such an event really is a series
of many causal events. The person pushes the first domino over. That
event, even though it ceases after the first domino has fallen , causes the
next domino to fall, and that event of falling, even though it ceases, causes
the next to fall , and so on. The falling of each domino, though in itself a
distinct causal event, can be traced back to the initial push without which
none of the dominos would fall. That initial push is the cause of all the
dominos falling, from the first to the last. The logical continuity refers to
this whole series of events initiated by the first cause, or push of the first
75
domino .
If for some reason this whole chain of events were stopped, the first
push would no longer be exerting its causal influence. Perhaps the
dominos were not set up properly, and, because there was too much space
between two of them , the falling of one domino did not cause the next one
to fall. Everything stopped . Perhaps another person intervened and set up
an obstacle between two dominos to prevent the falling of one to cause the
falling of the other. Everything stopped. If this happened, then in order for
the last domino in the line to fall , someone would have to push again . If
this were the case, the first push could not be the cause of the falling of the
last domino. The second push would be the cause of the falling of the last
domino . The initial causal action , the initial pushing of the first domino,
could no longer be considered the principal cause of the last effect, the
falling of the last domino .
Herman Reith provides a good description of this type of logical
continuity found in a series of causes .
An effect may be produced by an arrangement of primary and
secondary causes in what is called a per se subordinate series of proper
causes. Their series has the following characteristics: the secondary
causes cannot act except as members of the series, even though they
have a nature that is properly a principle of movement; each member of
the series affects the total effect; each cause in the series has a mode of
causation proper to its nature; there must be a limited number of these
causes, a first in the series, and this is not dependent upon other causes
but the others are dependent upon it.
In accord with the principle of causality, if there were no first
cause to which the effect can ultimately be traced, there would be no
effect at all. The other members of the series cannot by themselves
produce the effect, since intermediate causes operate not only in virtue
of their own nature but require in addition the influence of a superior
cause. If all causes were intermediate causes, even if there were an
infinite series of such causes, there would not be in the series a
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sufficient explanation of the effect that takes place. Only the presence
in the series of a cause that is universally the source of the total line of
76
causality will explain the effect.

Such a line of causality can be seen from the conjugal act to conception.
The conjugal act is the first cause (the principal cause) in the series. The
intermediate causes in the series are the natural processes. These natural
processes have a mode of causation proper to their nature. They lead to
and so influence the final effect, but they can do so only as a part of the
series. They are dependent upon the conjugal act as the first cause in the
series and so assist the conjugal act, because their own proper mode of
causation could not lead to conception unless it was initiated by another
cause. If these natural processes were initiated by a cause other than the
conjugal act, they would be subordinate to the cause that initiated the series
and not the conjugal act. Thus, the effect (conception) would ultimately be
explained by the cause that initiated the series, which would be, then, the
principal cause of conception.
For example, one of the natural processes subsequent to the conjugal
act is the natural motility of the sperm ; this is a type of causation proper to
its nature. The natural motility of the sperm can lead to and so influence
the final effect of conception only as a part of a series of causal events that
is initiated by another cause. The natural motility of the sperm, as well as
the other natural causal processes, are dependent upon the cause that
initiates the series, and so that cause is the principal cause of conception. If
the conjugal act initiates this series of natural causal processes, it is the
principal cause of conception. If a reproductive technology initiates this
series of natural causal processes, it is the principal cause of conception.
The conjugal act initiates a whole series of causal events leading to
conception, and both the temporal continuity and the logical continuity
derived from efficient causality must be preserved for the conjugal act to be
the principal cause of conception. If the natural processes subsequent to
intercourse and leading to conception were stopped and then started again
by a technical intervention, the conjugal act would no longer be the
principal cause of conception. The technical intervention that starts the
processes anew would be the principal cause of conception, for the natural
causal processes would be dependent upon the technical intervention in
bringing about conception and not the conjugal act.
Cataldo overlooks this type of causal continuity of the natural
processes. He insists that the line must be drawn at the immediate causal
factors that are natural. He believes that if one does not draw the line there ,
any intervention subsequent to intercourse would be considered a
replacement of the conjugal act. 77 Yet this is not so. A subsequent
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intervention usurps the principal causality of the conjugal act if it stops this
series of natural causal events, or if it initiates this series of natural causal
events by itself or anew. Thus, it is possible to have a subsequent
intervention that still assists the conjugal act, provided that, even though it
might modifY or affect this natural causal chain to some extent, it does not
stop this causal chain of events or it does not initiate this causal chain of
events by itself or anew.
iii. Logical Continuity Derived from Final Causality

There is a third type of continuity of a causal chain, another type of
logical continuity, this one derived from final causality. Take the example
of a contractor building a house. He initiates many causal actions to
complete construction of the house and each one is united by the same goal,
the construction of the house. With respect to the same goal, all these
individual causal actions fall under the one activity of building the house.
In fact it does not matter how many individual actions or agents are
involved, provided that they are all united under the same goal. The
contractor might engage several subcontractors for different parts of the
work, pouring the foundation , plumbing, wiring, etc. By the logical unity
flowing from the same goal of building the house, all these actions fall
under the one activity of building the house.78
This type of logical continuity is necessary for the continuity of the
causal chain. If the end is changed to something else, the continuity is
broken. If one soccer player passes the ball to a second player to score a
goal, but the second player turns traitor and passes the ball to the opposing
team so that the opposing team might score, the continuity is broken. 79
Though this type of logical continuity is necessary to preserve the
continuity of a causal chain, by itself it is not sufficient. Temporal
continuity and the logical continuity derived from efficient causality are
also necessary. This was seen above in the discussion of McCarthy' s and
Grisez's moral analysis of GIFT/TOTS. They hold that there must be a
moral unity derived from the end between the conjugal act and the
technical intervention. Grisez proposes that as long as there is a true
conjugal act, and as long as the semen used is deposited in the vagina and
then removed, the subsequent technical interventions are said to assist the
conjugal act in achieving conception insofar as they share in the same goal
as the conjugal act, achieving conception. If, however, the goals of the
subsequent interventions are diverse from the conjugal act, for example,
delaying conception to another time or experimentation, the technical
interventions can no longer be said to assist the conjugal act. Grisez rightly
observes that the sameness of end must be maintained, but he overlooks
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that the logical continuity derived from efficient causality and the temporal
continuity of the natural causal processes initiated with the conjugal act, as
well as the next type of continuity to be discussed, must also be preserved.

iv. The Continuity between Principal Cause and Effect
The final type of continuity of a causal chain IS based on the
distinction between principal and assisting causes. There must be
continuity between the principal cause and the effect. To maintain this
continuity, the principal cause must be chiefly responsible for bringing
about the effect, and the assisting cause must playa subordinate role in
bringing about the effect. Otherwise, the "principal cause" is no longer the
principal cause.80
Seifert, unfortunately, does not clarity how one determines which
cause is chiefly responsible for bringing about the effect, and which cause
is subordinate. This determination, in fact, is difficult. Instead, he
provides examples of assisting causes. An assisting cause is one that
provides the means that render possible the effects of the principal cause or
removes obstacles to the principal cause so that it may carry out its action.
For example, the use of artificial fallopian tubes to replace the obstructed
ones or the introduction of slippery S mucus into the vagina would render
possible the effects of the conjugal act. 81
The evaluation other authors provide of GIFT/TOTS, if further
developed, can illustrate another way to determine whether something is a
principal or assisting cause. Donald DeMarco, Benedict Ashley, Kevin
O'Rourke, William May, and John Haas observe that when GIFT/TOTS is
employed, the conjugal act is merely incidental to the achievement of
pregnancy, for it is only a means to obtain sperm. The procedure could be
employed successfully without the conjugal act at all, provided that the
sperm is obtained in some way other than the conjugal act. 82 Thus, they
implicitly propose the following criterion: There must be an essential link
between the conjugal act and the technical means employed, that is, the
conjugal act must not be merely incidental to the success of the technical
means employed. Thus, any technical means that does not have such an
essential bond with the conjugal act replaces it. The child conceived would
be the fruit of the technical means, because the conjugal act remains only
incidental to the whole process. Based on this criterion, These authors
judge GIFT/TOTS to be illicit. In GIFT/TOTS, the conjugal act is merely
incidental to the process. It is only employed to obtain sperm. It has no
essential link to the technical process.
This criterion is straightforward and quite helpful. Yet a notion of
causality, namely the distinction between principal cause and assisting
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cause, must be considered. In light of this further elaboration, one can then
see how helpful indeed this criterion is for determining whether something
is a principal or assisting cause. As already discussed, the child conceived
must be the fruit of the conjugal act. A technical means may assist the
conjugal act.
So the conjugal act must be the principal cause of
conception, and any technical means must be the assisting cause of
conception. A principal cause is necessary and primarily responsible for
bringing about the effect. An assisting cause plays a subordinate role in
bringing about the effect. It is not always easy to determine which cause is
primary and which cause is subordinate in bringing about the effect.
However, if the conjugal act remains only incidental to the whole process,
and if the technical means could be employed successfully without it, then
the conjugal act cannot be the principal cause of conception. Having
examined this notion of causality to develop further this criterion, one
might elaborate the criterion in this way: If the conjugal act is merely
incidental to the technical means employed, that is, if the technical means
can be employed successfully without it, the conjugal act can no longer be
considered the principal cause of conception. It has been replaced by the
technical means. Though this criterion elaborates a necessary condition for
determining whether a technical intervention plays a subordinate role to the
conjugal act, it is not sufficient to determine whether the technology plays a
subordinate role in all cases. It may be possible, for example, that a
reproductive technology requires the conjugal act to be successful, but the
conjugal act might still play the subordinate role in bringing about
conception.
There is another way in which other human agents as causes may be
said to be assisting causes to the principal cause who is another human
agent. To elucidate this, one may return to the example of the contractor
who is building a house. He employs several subcontractors in building
this house. All of the people involved share in the same end and hence the
same activity of building the house. The contractor himself may do the
minority of the actual labor of building, but he could still be considered the
principal cause of the house insofar as all the subcontractors are working
under his direction. In this way he plays the primary role in bringing about
the house, and the subcontractors playa subordinate role.
These types of principal and assisting causes, in which other human
agents assist the principal human agent insofar as they are under the
principal's overall direction, is also evident in the use of reproductive
technologies. For example, a married couple has difficulty conceiving and
employs doctors and technicians to carry out the GIFT/TOTS procedure.
Insofar as the couple has initiated this procedure and sees to its overall
direction, they could be considered the principal causes of the resulting
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conception, and the doctors and technicians the assisting causes. However,
this does not mean that the procedure assists the conjugal act! The
doctors and technicians may be assisting the spouses to achieve conception
in this way, but they may not be assisting the spouses to achieve conception
by assisting the conjugal act to achieve conception . This type of assisting
causality in which other human agents are under the direction of a principal
human agent does not guarantee that the conjugal act is assisted.
Magisterial teaching indicates that the conjugal act of the spouses may be
assisted but not replaced. It is not simply a matter of just assisting the
spouses in achieving conception.

v. Summary
In sum, it is seen why there must not be a break in the continuity of
the natural causal processes which are subsequent to intercourse and which
lead to conception . The conjugal act must be the principal cause of
conception, and it exercises this causality through a natural causal process
or a natural causal chain. The conjugal act and the subsequent natural
causal processes are intimately Iinked in bringing about conception .
Conception would not occur without either. In the marital embrace, the
spouses initiate a whole series of natural causal events that may continue
for days before conception may result.
Thus, for the conjugal act to exercise its causality in bringing about
conception, it must do so by initiating a natural causal process. By
examining how principal causes work through a series of subordinate
causes, it has been seen that if the continuity of the causal process is
interrupted, then the initial cause can no longer be considered the principal
cause. Seifert proposes four aspects to the continuity of the process:
temporal continuity, logical continuity derived from efficient causality,
logical continuity derived from final causality, and the continuity derived
from the link between the principal cause and the effect. If any aspect of
this continuity is broken , the initial cause of the process can no longer be
considered the principal cause of the final effect.
It seems, though , that the first two aspects of the continuity of the
causal process can be reduced to one. If there is ever a complete temporal
hiatus in the causal process, the first initial cause has stopped exerting its
influence, and likewise, then, the logical link between the cause initiating
the process and all the subsequent causal events in the series is sundered.
Any intervening cause starting the process again would then become the
principal cause of the final effect of the process, for the initial cause would
no longer be exerting its causal influence. Thus, Seifert' s first two aspects
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of the continuity of the causal process wi II be considered as one, that is, the
continuity derived from efficient causality.
If a
There remain then, two additional aspects of continuity.
subsequent, intervening cause does not share in the same goal as the initial
cause that started the process, it cannot be considered to assist the initial
cause. The continuity of the process is thus broken. Finally, if any
subsequent cause does not playa subordinate role in bringing about the
final effect of the causal chain, but rather is primarily responsible for
bringing about the final effect, then the continuity between the cause
initiating the process and the final effect has been broken insofar as that
first initiating cause cannot be considered the principal cause of the final
effect of the causal chain. Thus, any investigation into assistance or
replacement must examine whether the three aspects of the continuity of
the causal chain are respected: (I) continuity derived from efficient
causality, (2) continuity derived from final causality, and (3) continuity
derived from the link between principal cause and effect.

B. The Criteria to Determine Whether a Reproductive Technology
Assists or Replaces the Conjugal Act.
In light of this discussion, it is quite clear that there are two basic
criteria to determine whether a reproductive technology assists or replaces
the conjugal act: /) There must be a natural conjugal act open to life. 2)
The child conceived must be the fruit of the conjugal act; that is, the
conjugal act must be the principle cause of conception. These criteria are
clearly indicated in Donum Vitae. It is clear and easy to determine whether
the first criterion is met. Yet, how does one determine whether the child
conceived is the fruit of the conjugal act? How does one determine
whether the conjugal act is the principal cause of conception? In light of
the previous discussion, I propose the following criteria to determine
whether a reproductive technology replaces the conjugal act as the
principal cause of conception .
a) The conjugal act remains the principal cause of conception if the
technical means only enables it to be performed.
b) The conjugal act remains the principal cause of conception if the
technical means only removes obstacles that prevent the conjugal act from
being effective, or if it only provides a means for the conjugal act to be
effective. In other words, the conjugal act remains the principal cause of
conception if the technical means only provides the active condition(s) for
the conjugal act to exercise its own principal causality.
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c) The conjugal act is not the principal cause of conception if the natural
causal chain initiated by the conjugal act and leading to conception is
interrupted by the technical means, that is, if the continuity derived from
efficient causality is violated.
i.) The natural causal process
stops it.

IS

interrupted if the technical means

ii .) The natural causal process is interrupted if the sperm are removed
from the woman's body after the conjugal act has taken place.
iii.) The natural causal process is interrupted if conception occurs
outside the woman's body.
iv.) The natural causal process is interrupted if the technical means
initiates the process anew once it has been stopped, or if the technical
means, instead of the conjugal act, initiates the natural causal chain
leading to conception .
d) The technical means does not assist the conjugal act if it does not share
in the same goal as the conjugal act, that is, if it violates the second aspect
of the continuity of the causal process, the continuity derived from final
causality.
e) The conjugal act is not the principal cause of conception if it is merely
incidental to the technical intervention, or if the technical means plays the
primary and not the subordinate role in causing conception . This would be
a violation of the third aspect of the continuity of the causal process, the
continuity derived from the link between principal cause and effect.
i.) The conjugal act is incidental to the technical means if it merely
serves as a means to obtain sperm .
ii.) The conjugal act is incidental to the technical means if it does not
require the conjugal act, that is, if the procedure can be successful
without the conjugal act.
iii .) The conjugal act is incidental to the technical means if the
gametes used by the procedure to obtain conception do not pertain to
the conjugal act. The gametes do not pertain to the conjugal act if the
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sperm used in the procedure are intentionally withheld from the
conjugal act, or the ova are removed prior to the conjugal act.
A definition of assistance and replacement of the conjugal act can
now be proposed. Assistance to the conjugal act is any means that enables

I,

the conjugal act to be performed, or any means that enables the conjugal
act to exercise its principal causality in achieving conception, either by
removing obstacles to the causal activity of the conjugal act or by
supplying its own causal activity that does not violate any of the three
aspects of the continuity of the causal process between the conjugal act and
conception. Replacement of the conjugal act is any means used to achieve
conception that becomes the principal cause of conception, either because
it does not entail the conjugal act at all, or because it violates any of the
three aspects of the continuity of the causal process between the conjugal
act and conception.
C. Application of the Criteria to Selected Reproductive Technologies
To better understand these criteria to determine assistance and
replacement, they will now be applied in a moral evaluation of a few
selected reproductive technologies, Low Tubal Ovum Transfer (L TOT),
Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT) or Tubal Ovum Transfer with
Sperm (TOTS), Intrauterine Insemination (lUI), and two methods that have
been proposed to help with a husband 's sperm deficiency.
LTOT can be described in this way:
This procedure . . . transfers only the woman's egg. The egg is
collected by laparoscopy and replaced for fertilization in the lower
portion of the fallopian tube close to the uterus. The couple engages in
83
sexual intercourse before and after replacement of the egg.
.
This procedure assists the conjugal act and so could be licit. It meets the
following criteria for determining assistance and replacement. There is a
true and proper conjugal act (I). The conjugal act is necessary for the
success of the procedure (2-e). The procedure does not interrupt the causal
chain of natural processes initiated by the conjugal act (2-c), because it
does not stop the causal chain (2-c-i), the sperm are not removed from the
mother' s body after intercourse and then later reintroduced (2-c-ii),
fertilization occurs within the mother' s body (2-c-iii), and it does not
initiate the <,:ausal chain anew (2-c-iv). Finally, the procedure removes
obstacles to the conjugal act and so allows it to be effective (2-b).
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Perhaps a bit of explanation of how it meets the criteria "2-b" and "2c" will help. Why does LTOT not interrupt the causal chain? The ovum is
removed from the mother' s body after the first act of intercourse. Why
does not the removal of the ovum subsequent to intercourse interrupt the
causal chain; whereas, removal of the sperm after intercourse interrupts of
causal chain? There is a disturbance in the normal natural processes. The
release of the ovum from the ovary and its movement into the fallopian
tube is a natural process of the mother' s body. Yet it is not properly part of
the causal activity initiated by the conjugal act. It occurs periodically
whether there is a conjugal act or not. Thus, complete stop, disruption,
alteration, or substitution of this natural process of the ovum ' s release and
migration down the fallopian tube does not disrupt the natural causal chain,
which is initiated by the conjugal act, so as to displace the conjugal act as
the principal cause of conception. Instead, this natural process of the
mother' s body supplies a condition for the conjugal act to be successful by
supplying an ovum to fertilize. Similarly in LTOT, the transfer of the
ovum past blockage in the fallopian tube, even though it modifies or
substitutes a natural process, supplies an active condition (criterion 2-b) for
the conjugal act to be successful. It in no way usurps the principal
causality of the conjugal act.
GIFT/TOTS can be described in this way. The ova are obtained by
laparoscopy. The sperm are collected after intercourse using a perforated
silastic sheath, or from the vagina or cervix, and then " washed." The
gametes are placed in a catheter separated by an air bubble or culture
medium and then injected into the fallopian tube .84
This procedure replaces the conjugal act because it violates the
following criteria. The conjugal act is incidental to the procedure (2-e)
insofar as it merely serves as a means to supply sperm (2-e-i), insofar as the
procedure can be successful without the conjugal act (2-e-ii), and,
depending upon how GIFT/TOTS is employed, insofar as the gametes used
by the procedure to achieve conception do not pertain to the conjugal act
(2-e-iii). In addition, the procedure breaks the natural causal chain initiated
by the conjugal act (2-c), because it stops it (2-c-i), because it removes the
sperm from the mother' s body (2-c-ii), and because it initiates the causal
chain anew (2-c-iv). Thus GIFT/TOTS is morally illicit.
lUI is a type of artificial insemination in which the sperm are washed
and then deposited in the uterine cavity by means of a catheter. 85 Cataldo
suggests a modified version of thi s procedure that he judges could be
morally licit. In this modified version, the sperm are collected with a
perforated silastic sheath used in a conjugal act. They are then "washed"
and deposited in the uterine cavity by means of a catheter. 86
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The moral evaluation of this modified version of lUI is similar to
GIFT/TOTS. It replaces the conjugal act because it violates the following
criteria. The conjugal act is incidental to the procedure (2-e) insofar as it
merely serves as a means to supply sperm (2-e-i), insofar as the procedure
can be successful without the conjugal act (2-e-ii), and insofar as the
gametes used to achieve conception do not pertain to the conjugal act (2-eiii). In addition, the procedure breaks the natural causal chain initiated by
the conjugal act (2-c), because it stops it (2-c-i), because it removes the
sperm from the mother's body (2-c-ii), and because it initiates the causal
chain anew (2-c-iv). Thus, even this modified form of lUI is morally illicit
for it replaces the conjugal act.
Finally, two methods have been proposed to help a husband with
sperm deficiency. Thomas O'Donnell, SJ has proposed this method to help
achieve conception when the husband suffers from oligospermia.
Oligospermia (a deficiency of sufficient spermatozoa in the
husband's ejaculate) may be overcome by collecting amounts of the
husband ' s ejaculate in acts of natural intercourse with a perforated
condom, which can be observed and spun down in the laboratory to
obtain a residue with a heavy concentration of sperm which can be
deposited artificially within the generative tract of the wife either
immediately before or after a normal act of intercourse, thus fortifying
the ejaculate of that act of intercourse with supplemental sperm
87
previously collected in legitimate marital acts.

Nicholas Tonti-Filippini has proposed a similar procedure for another
circumstance.
A man who had become steri Ie from some form of therapy, such
as for carcinoma, might have had the foresight to freeze his 0\\11 sperm
(having been licitly obtained), prior to the therapy. The sperm might
then be used by the spouses in the context of the conjugal act, knowing
that the ejaculate was sterile, but adding to it the previously stored
sample. 88

These methods replace the conjugal act because they violate the
following criterion. The conjugal act is incidental to the procedure (2-e)
because the procedure could be successfully employed without it (2-e-ii).
What really takes place here is an act of artificial insemination that just
happens to be accompanied by an act of intercourse. These methods could
be successful without the accompanying act of intercourse. Because
intercourse is merely incidental to the success of conception, it cannot be
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considered the principal cause of conception.
morally illicit.

Thus, these methods are

Conclusion
This investigation began with a question. How does one determine
whether a reproductive technology assists or replaces the conjugal act? As
a result, an effort was made to propose criteria by which one can
distinguish assistance from replacement.
Was this investigation
successful? Was the question that began this investigation answered? Yes
and no. The question has been answered, but still more development would
be helpful. This investigation has articulated a better understanding of
assistance and replacement. It has proposed useful criteria to determine
whether a reproductive technology assists or replaces the conjugal act. Yet
further development would be helpful to apply better the Church's
teaching. A deeper understanding of ways to distinguish principal and
assisting causes could foster an improved articulation of criterion 2-e, the
criterion which is based on the continuity of the causal process that is
derived from the link between principal cause and effect. If one has a
deeper understanding of principal and assisting causes, one can determine
better when another cause usurps the principal causality of the conjugal act.
In addition, a further analysis might help to determine how a causal process
is stopped, that is, how the continuity of the causal process that is derived
from efficient causality is violated. This could foster an improved
articulation of criterion 2-c .
In conclusion, the human person should stand in awe and wonder at
the mystery of human life, at the mystery of God 's creative gift of human
life. Contemplation of God ' s ineffable self-gift in creating leads to deeper
understanding, deeper esteem, and deeper reverence for all human persons,
for all human life. Only from this interior disposition permeated with
Divine Wisdom, should all decisions about reproductive technologies be
made. " So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he
created him; male and female he created them" (Gn. I: 27).
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